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Article 
Remedies for Undocumented Noncitizens 
in the Workplace: Using International 
Law to Narrow the Holding of Hoffman 
Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB 
David Weissbrodt† 
In Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, the U.S. 
Supreme Court denied the National Labor Relations Act 
(NLRA) back-pay claims of a worker wrongfully discharged for 
union organizing.1 The Supreme Court’s 2002 decision reasoned 
that the worker should not be able to recover back pay under 
the NLRA because he was a noncitizen and not entitled to em-
ployment.2 The Inter-American Court of Human Rights and the 
International Labor Organization (ILO) Freedom of Association 
Committee have rejected the Hoffman decision and criticized 
the United States for its discrimination against noncitizens.3 
The Inter-American Court of Human Rights and the ILO 
Committee held that, while a noncitizen may not have the right 
to enter the United States or to seek employment, once he has 
been employed he is entitled to equal treatment with U.S. 
workers regarding freedom of association and the right to or-
 
†  Regents Professor and Fredrikson & Byron Professor of Law, Univer-
sity of Minnesota Law School. The author thanks Natalie Woodward Kohner 
for her assistance in preparing this Article and also thanks Mary Rumsey, Ka-
therine Sewell, and Lisa Stratton for their comments and suggestions. Copy-
right © 2008 by David Weissbrodt. 
 1. 535 U.S. 137, 140–41 (2002). 
 2. Id. at 151. 
 3. See Juridical Condition and Rights of the Undocumented Migrants, 
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. Advisory Op. OC-18/03, at 113 (Sept. 17, 2003), available at 
http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/opiniones/seriea_18_ing.pdf [hereinafter Advi-
sory Opinion OC-18/03]; Int’l Labor Org. [ILO], Comm. on Freedom of Ass’n, 
Complaints Against the Government of the United States Presented by the 
American Federation of Labor and the Congress of Industrial Organizations 
(AFL-CIO) and the Confederation of Mexican Workers (CTM), Report No. 332, 
Case No. 2227, Vol. LXXXVI, 2003, Series B, No. 3 (Oct. 18, 2002).  
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ganize trade unions.4 Since 2002, some U.S. courts have nar-
rowed the application of Hoffman.5 Other courts have widened 
the scope of the holding to prevent noncitizens from accessing 
other forms of recovery.6 This Article examines how U.S. courts 
have applied the Hoffman decision to employment cases under 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The Article argues that 
interpreting Title VII through the lens of relevant treaties, in-
cluding the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights, would render the decision in Hoffman inapplicable to 
Title VII employment cases and would sufficiently narrow the 
Hoffman decision to comply with the Inter-American Court of 
Human Rights and the ILO decisions. 
I.  THE HOFFMAN DECISION AND THE RESPONSES OF 
U.S. AND INTERNATIONAL COURTS   
The Court in Hoffman denied back pay to José Castro on 
the basis of his noncitizen status. Courts have encountered dif-
ficulties applying Hoffman to subsequent cases concerning em-
ployment and labor rights of undocumented noncitizens. While 
some courts have narrowed the holding in Hoffman, others 
have broadened the decision and applied it to deny Title VII re-
lief on the basis of the plaintiff ’s immigration status. Two 
prominent international bodies have examined the Hoffman 
decision. The Inter-American Court of Human Rights and the 
ILO Committee on Freedom of Association both issued opinions 
strongly critical of Hoffman.  
 
 4. Advisory Opinion OC-18/03, supra note 3, at 106. 
 5. E.g., Madeira v. Affordable Hous. Found., Inc., 469 F.3d 219, 248–49 
(2d Cir. 2006).  
 6. E.g., Oro v. 23 E. 79th St. Corp., 810 N.Y.S.2d 779, 783 (App. Div. 
2005). The Supreme Court’s refusal to find undocumented noncitizens a sus-
pect class may also hinder plaintiffs’ attempts to gain relief for discrimination 
on the basis of their immigration status. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 219 
n.19 (1982); see also Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 284 (1986); League of 
United Latin Am. Citizens (LULAC) v. Bredesen, 500 F.3d 523, 528 (6th Cir. 
2007); LeClerc v. Webb, 419 F.3d 405, 415 (5th Cir. 2005); Vasquez-Velezmoro 
v. INS, 281 F.3d 693, 697 (8th Cir. 2002). This difficulty may be less applicable 
in Title VII cases because the discrimination alleged by the plaintiffs would be 
based upon membership in another suspect class category (e.g., race, gender). 
In that instance, courts are likely to rely on equal protection rights for undoc-
umented noncitizens and find the plaintiffs entitled to relief. See Plyler, 457 
U.S. at 215; Rosales-Garcia v. Holland, 322 F.3d 386, 409 (6th Cir. 2003); Do-
herty v. Thornburgh, 943 F.2d 204, 208 (2d Cir. 1991); Lynch v. Cannatella, 
810 F.2d 1363, 1373 (5th Cir. 1987). 
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A. TITLE VII OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964 
Section 703(a)(1) of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 
prohibits an employer from discriminating on the basis of race, 
color, religion, sex, or national origin in hiring, firing, compen-
sation, or other terms and conditions of work.7 This Act pro-
vides individuals with several forms of relief if a court deter-
mines an employer discriminated against an employee. The 
court may order “reinstatement or hiring of employees, with or 
without back pay (payable by the employer, employment agen-
cy, or labor organization, as the case may be, responsible for 
the unlawful employment practice), or any other equitable re-
lief as the court deems appropriate.”8 Because the court cannot 
legally compel the employer to rehire a noncitizen who has no 
authorization to work in the United States,9 the court’s only op-
tion when the employer of a noncitizen has engaged in discrim-
ination is to order back pay or other equitable relief.  
B. HOFFMAN PLASTIC COMPOUNDS, INC. V. NLRB 
Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc., hired José Castro to mix 
its products in 1988.10 At that time, Castro presented docu-
ments to the company indicating that he could legally work in 
the United States.11 At a hearing in 1993, Castro testified that 
he had been born in Mexico and was not legally authorized to 
work in this country.12 Castro stated that he had borrowed 
another person’s documentation when he began work at Hoff-
man in order to demonstrate legal authorization to work.13 
In December 1988, Castro distributed authorization cards 
to other workers as part of a unionization effort.14 Hoffman re-
sponded to Castro’s union activities by firing him in January 
1989.15 In 1992, the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) 
found that Hoffman had illegally fired Castro for his work with 
the union and ordered the company to give Castro back pay as 
relief.16 The Supreme Court vacated the NLRB’s award of back 
 
 7. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1964). 
 8. Id. § 2000e-5(g). 
 9. Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137, 140 (2002). 
 10. Id.  
 11. Id. 
 12. Id. at 141. 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id. at 140. 
 15. Id. 
 16. Id. at 140–41. 
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pay, holding that awarding this type of remedy to an “illegal 
alien[]” conflicted with the public policy goals of the Immigra-
tion Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA).17 The Court rea-
soned that allowing back pay to noncitizens would both encour-
age and condone undocumented immigration to the United 
States.18 
The Court’s decision leaves many issues unresolved. While 
this case involved an act of fraud by the undocumented worker, 
the Court admits that the violation of IRCA can be caused by 
the employer, since either “the undocumented alien tenders 
fraudulent identification, which subverts the cornerstone of 
IRCA’s enforcement mechanism, or the employer knowingly 
hires the undocumented alien in direct contradiction of its IR-
CA obligations.”19 In instances where the employer is at fault, 
the Court declined to address whether back pay may be appro-
priate.20 The policy reasoning of the decision could be used to 
deny noncitizens other benefits that may induce them to seek 
unauthorized employment in the United States.21 The decision 
does not, however, mention any benefits or remedies other than 
back pay under the NLRA. The decision does not even mention 
the NLRB’s ability to award other remedies. Facing other un-
documented workers’ employment claims, lower courts must 
assess the breadth of the Supreme Court’s decision in Hoffman. 
C. THE DOMESTIC EFFECTS OF HOFFMAN  
Several cases have addressed the application of the Hoff-
man decision to other labor contexts. Courts have considered 
Hoffman’s effect outside the NLRA context and in cases where 
employees seek relief other than back pay. Some courts have 
narrowed its effects; others have used its reasoning more 
broadly to limit noncitizen employees’ access to relief. 
In Madeira v. Affordable Housing Foundation, Inc., the 
Second Circuit allowed a noncitizen to receive monetary dam-
ages for workplace injuries, thus narrowing the Hoffman hold-
ing to apply solely to back-pay awards.22 Questions about the 
 
 17. Id. at 151; see also Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. 
L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 
U.S.C.). 
 18. Hoffman, 535 U.S. at 150.  
 19. Id. at 148.  
 20. Id.  
 21. See id.  
 22. Madeira v. Affordable Hous. Found., Inc., 469 F.3d 219, 249 (2d Cir. 
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broader applicability of Madeira persist due to the court’s rea-
soning. The Second Circuit allowed the award because New 
York law explicitly included noncitizens in the list of eligible 
workers and the Second Circuit was reluctant to use the 
Court’s interpretation of IRCA to circumvent state law.23 In in-
stances where state law does not explicitly include noncitizens, 
the court’s ruling may be of little help in asserting a claim for 
damages. 
Courts have come to differing conclusions regarding Hoff-
man and discrimination complaints. In Rivera v. NIBCO, Inc., 
the Ninth Circuit found the reasoning in Hoffman inapplicable 
to Title VII complaints.24 The court ordered relief under that 
Act for a noncitizen whose employer violated the discrimination 
prohibitions of Title VII.25 The contrary holding of the Fourth 
Circuit in Egbuna v. Time-Life Libraries, Inc.26 generates con-
fusion concerning the application of Hoffman to discrimination 
complaints. Decided prior to Hoffman, Egbuna relied on the 
policies of IRCA in refusing to require employers to rehire an 
undocumented worker.27 
District courts and state courts have added to the uncer-
tainty when interpreting the scope of Hoffman in an employ-
ment context. In Escobar v. Spartan Security Service, the Dis-
trict Court for the Southern District of Texas allowed the 
plaintiff to seek relief under Title VII.28 That court’s reasoning 
may not be widely applicable to the undocumented noncitizen 
because the plaintiff subsequently acquired authorization to 
work in the United States after suffering Title VII discrimina-
tion.29 In Mora v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board, a 
Pennsylvania state court allowed the suspension of weekly 
wage benefits to an undocumented noncitizen injured on the 
job.30 The court, however, required the defendant-employer to 
 
2006). 
 23. Id. at 236; see also Madeira v. Affordable Hous. Found., Inc., 315 F. 
Supp. 2d 504, 507 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (holding that New York’s public policy does 
not prohibit back pay for noncitizens injured at work); Safeharbor Employer 
Servs. I, Inc. v. Velasquez, 860 So. 2d 984, 985–86 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003) 
(holding that the Florida legislature’s ability to allow workers’ compensation 
benefits to noncitizens is not prohibited by Hoffman).  
 24. 364 F.3d 1057, 1065 (9th Cir. 2004). 
 25. Id. at 1061. 
 26. 153 F.3d 184 (4th Cir. 1998). 
 27. Id. at 187.  
 28. 281 F. Supp. 2d 895, 897 (S.D. Tex. 2003). 
 29. Id. 
 30. 845 A.2d 950, 954 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2004).  
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continue paying medical benefits.31 In Renteria v. Italia Foods, 
Inc.,32 the District Court for the Northern District of Illinois al-
lowed undocumented workers’ claims for back pay and compen-
satory damages to go forward under both the Fair Labor Stan-
dards Act of 193833 and the Illinois Minimum Wage Law.34  
Other lower courts have widened their application of the 
Hoffman holding. These courts have considered Hoffman rele-
vant in various ways to workplace claims by noncitizens. In Oro 
v. 23 East 79th Street Corp., the New York Appellate Division 
held that a plaintiff can seek at trial to establish a claim for 
lost earnings, but his immigration status may be the subject of 
discovery and will be relevant to the amount of damages that 
may be claimed.35 In Sanchez v. Eagle Alloy Inc., a Michigan 
court permitted the defendant to suspend weekly wage benefits 
under the state unemployment compensation law to an em-
ployee it had fired and then later learned was undocumented.36 
The court held that because the employee committed a crime in 
unlawfully seeking employment, the employer could suspend 
weekly wage benefits.37 In Veliz v. Rental Service Corp. USA, 
the District Court for the Middle District of Florida cited Hoff-
man in denying the plaintiff ’s IRCA claim for lost wages since 
he was an undocumented worker.38 Other courts have only al-
lowed claims for lost wages in the amount the noncitizen could 
expect to earn if working within his or her home nation.39 The 
Superior Court of New Jersey held that Hoffman prevents un-
documented noncitizens from receiving both economic and non-
 
 31. Id. at 955. 
 32. No. 02 C 495, 2003 WL 21995190, at *6–7 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 21, 2003).  
 33. 29 U.S.C. § 201 (1940).  
 34. 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 105/4(a) (2006).  
 35. Oro v. 23 E. 79th St. Corp., 810 N.Y.S.2d 779, 783 (App. Div. 2005).  
 36. 658 N.W.2d 510, 512 (Mich. Ct. App. 2003).  
 37. Id. at 520. 
 38. Veliz v. Rental Serv. Corp. USA, 313 F. Supp. 2d 1317, 1336 (M.D. 
Fla. 2003). 
 39. See, e.g., Rosa v. Partners in Progress, Inc., 868 A.2d 994, 1000 (N.H. 
2004) (allowing the plaintiff ’s claim for lost earnings; maintaining that, in 
most circumstances, lost earnings must be measured in the prevailing rate of 
the plaintiff ’s home country, unless the employer knew or should have known 
the employee’s undocumented status; and finding that an undocumented non-
citizen’s status is relevant to the question of lost earnings and can be intro-
duced by the defendant at trial); Sanango v. 200 E. 16th St. Hous. Corp., 788 
N.Y.S.2d 314, 321 (App. Div. 2004) (holding that the injured plaintiff, who was 
an undocumented noncitizen, could only receive back pay under the workers’ 
compensation law for the wages he would be able to earn in his home country). 
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economic relief under Title VII for discriminatory termination 
where the plaintiff was fired due to her pregnancy.40 
D. INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE TO HOFFMAN  
Following the Hoffman decision, the government of Mexico 
requested an advisory opinion from the Inter-American Court 
of Human Rights concerning the legality of depriving nonciti-
zen workers of employment rights.41 The government was espe-
cially concerned with two potential implications of the Hoffman 
decision. First, Mexico feared that migrant workers’ “vulnera-
bility makes them an easy target for violations of their human 
rights, based, above all, on criteria of discrimination and, con-
sequently, places them in a situation of inequality before the 
law as regards the effective enjoyment and exercise of these 
rights.”42 Mexico was also concerned that Hoffman’s interpreta-
tion of national labor laws could allow for more widespread 
abuse of noncitizens. As the Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights explained, “This could encourage employers to use those 
laws or interpretations to justify a progressive loss of other la-
bor rights; for example: payment of overtime, seniority, out-
standing wages and maternity leave, thus abusing the vulnera-
ble status of undocumented migrant workers.”43 The court 
determined that member states “may not subordinate or condi-
tion observance of the principle of equality before the law and 
nondiscrimination to achieving their public policy goals, what-
ever these may be, including those of a migratory character.”44  
The court’s opinion stressed that a member state could le-
gally distinguish between undocumented and documented 
workers. Once the employment relationship has begun, howev-
er, “the migrant acquires rights as a worker, which must be 
recognized and guaranteed, irrespective of his regular or irre-
gular status in the State of employment.”45 The court argued 
that principles of equality and nondiscrimination are jus cogens 
norms, applicable to all states, because 
the State has the obligation to respect and guarantee the labor hu-
man rights of all workers, irrespective of their status as nationals or 
 
 40. Crespo v. Evergo Corp., 841 A.2d 471, 472 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 
2004).  
 41. Advisory Opinion OC-18/03, supra note 3, at 1–2. 
 42. Id. at 2.  
 43. Id.  
 44. Id. at 114.  
 45. Id. at 105–06.  
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aliens, and not to tolerate situations of discrimination that are harm-
ful to the latter in the employment relationships established between 
private individuals (employer-worker).46 
In addition, the ILO Committee on Freedom of Association 
issued a decision concerning Hoffman.47 The Committee, while 
especially concerned about the effects of this case on unioniza-
tion efforts, noted that removing back pay as a form of relief for 
noncitizens could devastate worker safety and well-being.48 The 
United States asserted that it had no international responsibil-
ities under the ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and 
Rights at Work or ILO Conventions 87 (upholding the right of 
workers to form labor unions) and 98 (establishing worker pro-
tections from acts of antiunion discrimination).49 The Commit-
tee, however, found the Hoffman decision so egregious as to vi-
olate the fundamental aims and principles behind the ILO 
Constitution.50 The Committee stated that Hoffman harmed 
the ILO’s ability to protect peace and social justice since it 
functionally denied undocumented noncitizens in the United 
States freedom to associate and join labor unions.51 The Com-
mittee stridently criticized the Supreme Court’s decision to 
weigh the goals of the NLRA against the IRCA. “Human rights 
cannot be abrogated to achieve policy goals,” the Committee 
wrote, “but rather must always have priority over these goals. 
Policy options must be formulated in compliance with basic 
human rights standards.”52 The Committee recommended that 
the United States create or amend legislation that would “bring 
it into conformity with freedom of association principles, in full 
consultation with the social partners concerned, with the aim of 
ensuring effective protection for all workers against acts of an-
tiunion discrimination in the wake of the Hoffman decision.”53  
 
 46. Id. at 113–14.  
 47. ILO, supra note 3. 
 48. Id. ¶ 565. 
 49. Id. ¶ 578; see also ILO, ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles 
and Rights at Work, June 19, 1998, 37 I.L.M. 1233, 1237–38; ILO, Convention 
(No. 87) Concerning Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Or-
ganize, July 9, 1948, 68 U.N.T.S. 17; ILO, Convention (No. 98) Concerning the 
Application of the Principles of the Right to Organize and to Bargain Collec-
tively, July 1, 1949, 96 U.N.T.S. 257.  
 50. ILO, supra note 3, ¶ 600.  
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. ¶ 573. 
 53. Id. ¶ 612. 
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II.  EXTENDING THE HOLDING IN HOFFMAN TO 
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION WOULD INCREASE 
WORKPLACE ABUSES   
Extending the Supreme Court’s holding in Hoffman to 
preclude noncitizens from receiving relief under Title VII would 
have several deleterious effects. At least seven million and as 
many as twenty million noncitizens reside and work in the 
United States without authorization.54 While these workers can 
no longer receive back-pay remedies through the NLRA, they 
may also be unable to receive back pay under Title VII as a re-
medy for employment discrimination.55 If Hoffman were ex-
tended to Title VII cases, noncitizens would face greater 
threats in the workplace. Employers could use discovery to de-
termine an individual’s immigration status.56 Noncitizens, fear-
ing that discovery could lead to removal, would thus be de-
terred from reporting forbidden discrimination and abuse.57 
Post-Hoffman, employer attempts to determine the immigra-
tion status of plaintiff-employees have drastically increased, 
and employers have also attempted to intimidate current work-
ers with these discoveries.58  
Many noncitizens employed in the United States suffer ab-
usive or exploitative working conditions. Migrants often receive 
lower wages for dangerous work in agricultural and garment 
manufacturing industries.59 Noncitizens are often employed in 
 
 54. Brad Knickerbocker, Illegal Immigrants in the U.S.—Just How 
Many?, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, May 16, 2006, at 1.  
 55. See supra notes 24–27 and accompanying text. 
 56. See supra note 35 and accompanying text. 
 57. See Colindres v. Quietflex Mfg., No. H-01-4319, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
27982, at *13 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 19, 2004) (holding that the plaintiffs must pro-
vide lists of current employees who do not assert back pay or lost future wages 
and the documents proving those persons’ legal authorization to work); Thorpe 
v. City of New York, No. 116924/03, 2005 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 3535, at *13 (N.Y. 
Sup. Ct. Nov. 30, 2005) (granting the defendant additional discovery of the 
plaintiff ’s identity and immigration status because the request was “material 
and relevant” to the jury’s determination of whether to award lost earnings 
based on wages the plaintiff may have earned in the United States). But see 
EEOC v. Rest. Co., 448 F. Supp. 2d 1085, 1088 (D. Minn. 2006) (denying dis-
covery of the plaintiff ’s immigration status in a Title VII sexual harassment 
and retaliation suit).  
 58. See Scott L. Cummings, The Internationalization of Public Interest 
Law, 57 DUKE L.J. (forthcoming 2008). 
 59. Connie de la Vega & Conchita Lozano-Batista, Advocates Should Use 
Applicable International Standards to Address Violations of Undocumented 
Migrant Workers’ Rights in the United States, 3 HASTINGS RACE & POVERTY 
L.J. 35, 41–43 (2005).  
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sweatshops or held in forced labor camps within the United 
States and its territories.60 Professors Connie de la Vega and 
Conchita Lozano-Batista determined that these “workers often 
work up to seven days a week for extremely low wages; 80-hour 
working weeks are common; and the health and safety of work-
ers . . . [are] constantly undermined. Additionally, workers 
have no security of employment, and women are discriminated 
against and harassed, sometimes sexually.”61 Employers who 
hire noncitizens are less likely to comply with labor regula-
tions, create safe working conditions, or provide security from 
harassment and discrimination, because they are already vi-
olating the law by hiring undocumented noncitizens.62 Such 
employers are “known for low wages, dangerous conditions, and 
frequent violations of labor laws.”63 
Extending the Hoffman decision to deny back-pay relief in 
Title VII and other claims would further discourage noncitizens 
from reporting abuse and discrimination by employers. Many 
workers fear that filing a complaint could lead to retaliation re-
sulting in removal or criminal prosecution.64 Employers could 
threaten noncitizens with dismissal if they complain of discrim-
ination or harassment. Employers have capitalized upon such 
fears by exaggerating the holding in Hoffman and attempting 
to deny other forms of recovery to noncitizens. For example,  
[a] New York attorney representing a meat market owner in a dispute 
over minimum wage wrote in a letter to a labor advocacy group, “I am 
sure you are aware of the ruling by the Supreme Court of the United 
States that illegal immigrants do not have the same rights as U.S. cit-
izens.” The letter also maintained that after Hoffman, a fired worker 
was not entitled to the difference between what he or she was paid 
and minimum wage because those wages owed constitute backpay.65 
 
 60. Id. at 40, 43.  
 61. Id. at 43 (footnotes omitted). 
 62. See Sara R. Bollerup, Comment, America’s Scapegoats: The Undocu-
mented Worker and Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. National Labor Rela-
tions Board, 38 NEW ENG. L. REV. 1009, 1012 (2004). 
 63. Sarah Cleveland et al., Inter-American Court of Human Rights Amicus 
Curiae Brief: The United States Violates International Law When Labor Law 
Remedies Are Restricted Based on Workers’ Migrant Status, 1 SEATTLE J. FOR 
SOC. JUST. 795, 805 (2003). 
 64. See de la Vega & Lozano-Batista, supra note 59, at 42 (noting that 
workers are afraid to report poor working conditions in part out of a “fear of 
retaliation by employers”). 
 65. Christine Dana Smith, Give Us Your Tired, Your Poor: Hoffman and 
the Future of Immigrants’ Workplace Rights, 72 U. CIN. L. REV. 363, 374 
(2003). 
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In addition, many of these employees only learn about 
their legal rights through their employers, furthering the em-
ployer’s ability to disseminate false and deleterious information 
to noncitizens concerning their ability to access legal relief.66 If 
courts bolster a wider reading of Hoffman, then employers will 
have even more support for their attempts to further dissuade 
employees from complaining. As the ILO Committee on Free-
dom of Association noted, “Eliminating the backpay remedy 
grants carte blanche to employers to violate undocumented 
workers’ rights with impunity, and discourages workers from 
exercising their rights.”67 
The consequences extend further. Not only are workers de-
nied their rights, but as Michael Wishnie pointed out in his 
amicus brief in the Hoffman proceedings, law-abiding compa-
nies are also harmed by competition with rogue employers who 
hire undocumented noncitizens and then cut business costs by 
refusing to pay minimum wages or maintain adequate safety 
standards.68 
III.  APPLYING INTERNATIONAL LAW TO NARROW 
HOFFMAN IN U.S. COURTS   
Courts will undoubtedly face further cases concerning 
whether Hoffman prevents undocumented noncitizens from re-
ceiving remedies for employment discrimination under Title 
VII, workers’ compensation claims, and other employment-
related problems. The extremely negative reaction of the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights and the ILO should dissuade 
U.S. courts from applying Hoffman to possibly analogous situa-
tions and should even encourage the Supreme Court to recon-
sider the balance it reached in Hoffman between the goals of 
preventing unauthorized immigration and ensuring fairness in 
the workplace. 
 
 66. Id. at 374–75. 
 67. Cleveland et al., supra note 63, at 909.  
 68. Brief Amici Curiae of Employers and Employer Organizations in Sup-
port of Respondent at 4, Hoffman Plastic Compounds v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137 
(2002) (No. 00-1595), 2001 WL 1631729, at *4 (noting that one association’s 
members “face unfair competition from contractors who ignore labor, health, 
and safety standards”); see Catherine Fisk & Michael Wishnie, The Story of 
Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB: Labor Rights Without Remedies 
for Undocumented Immigrants, in LABOR LAW STORIES 399, 438 (Laura J. 
Cooper & Catherine L. Fisk eds., 2005).  
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A. THE JUS COGENS NORM OF NONDISCRIMINATION 
If a norm qualifies as jus cogens—that is, as a peremptory 
norm of international law69—then a “controlling executive or 
legislative act or judicial decision,”70 a contrary treaty, a reser-
vation, or a persistent objection would not excuse U.S. violation 
of that norm.71 The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 
recognizes and defines the concept of jus cogens as “a norm ac-
cepted and recognized by the international community of States 
as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted 
and which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of gener-
al international law having the same character.”72 If a new pe-
remptory norm of international law is identified, Article 64 of 
the Vienna Convention declares “any existing treaty which is in 
conflict with that norm becomes void and terminates.”73 
The Inter-American Court of Human Rights determined 
that the principle of nondiscrimination against noncitizens in 
the workplace had risen to the status of jus cogens.74 The court 
had three reasons to support that conclusion. First, the court 
demonstrated that the principle of nondiscrimination was a 
norm of general international law through locating it in several 
treaties and other instruments.75 The court identified prohibi-
tions against discrimination in the American Convention,76 the 
Charter of the Organization of American States,77 the Ameri-
can Declaration,78 the International Covenant on Civil and Po-
 
 69. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 876 (8th ed. 2004). 
 70. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900) (“[W]here there is no 
treaty and no controlling executive or legislative act or judicial decision, resort 
must be had to the customs and usages of civilized nations.”). 
 71. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 53, opened for signa-
ture May 23, 1969, 115 U.N.T.S. 331 (entered into force Jan. 27, 1980).  
 72. Id.; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF 
THE UNITED STATES § 102 cmt. k (1987) (“Some rules of international law are 
recognized by the international community of states as peremptory, permit-
ting no derogation.”). 
 73. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 71, art. 64.  
 74. Advisory Opinion OC-18/03, supra note 3, at 113. 
 75. Id. at 94. 
 76. Organization of American States [OAS], American Convention on 
Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123. 
 77. Charter of the OAS, Apr. 30, 1948, 2 U.S.T. 2394, 119 U.N.T.S. 3, 
amended by Protocol of Buenos Aires, Feb. 27, 1967, 21 U.S.T. 607, 721 
U.N.T.S. 324, amended by Protocol of Cartagena de Indias, Dec. 5, 1985, 
O.A.S.T.S. No. 66, 25 I.L.M. 527, amended by Protocol of Washington, Dec. 4, 
1985, 33 I.L.M. 1005, amended by Protocol of Managua, June 12, 1993, 33 
I.L.M. 1009. 
 78. OAS, American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man (1948), 
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litical Rights,79 and the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights.80 Second, the court stressed the duties of states to re-
spect human rights since these rights inherently stem from 
human dignity and are widely recognized within the relevant 
treaties.81 Third, the court broadly interpreted the duty of 
states to guarantee nondiscrimination, reasoning that discrim-
ination included any “exclusion, restriction or privilege that is 
not objective and reasonable, and which adversely affects hu-
man rights.”82 Preventing such discrimination had risen to the 
status of jus cogens because discrimination would destroy other 
jus cogens norms, such as equality before the law.83 The court 
examined the effects of raising the norm of nondiscrimination 
to the status of jus cogens and found it necessary in order to 
preserve both international public order and the legal structure 
of international law.84 
United States courts, however, have been reluctant to ap-
ply jus cogens to cases involving claims by U.S. citizens or 
against the U.S. government. Prior to 1988, no federal court 
had considered the concept of jus cogens as a basis of its deci-
sion.85 By 1999, U.S. courts had only recognized rights under 
jus cogens as applying to foreign governments and citizens, 
principally under the Alien Tort Claims Act,86 but had never 
recognized a cause of action for U.S. citizens against the U.S. 
government based upon jus cogens.87 
 
compiled in BASIC DOCUMENTS PERTAINING TO HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE INTER-
AMERICAN SYSTEM 17, OEA/Ser.L.V/II.82 doc. 6 rev. 1 (1992). 
 79. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, S. 
TREATY DOC. NO. 95-20, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter Civil and Political Co-
venant].  
 80. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, at 71, U.N. 
GAOR, 3d Sess., 1st plen. mtg. U.N. Doc A/810 (Dec. 12, 1948). 
 81. Advisory Opinion OC-18/03, supra note 3, at 92. 
 82. Id. at 95. 
 83. Id. at 99 (“Accordingly, this Court considers that the principle of 
equality before the law, equal protection before the law[,] and non-
discrimination belongs to jus cogens, because the whole legal structure of na-
tional and international public order rests on it and it is a fundamental prin-
ciple that permeates all laws.”). 
 84. Id.  
 85. See Comm. of U.S. Citizens Living in Nicar. v. Reagan, 859 F.2d 929, 
940 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (“So far as we know, no federal court has ever considered 
the concept—much less the effect—of jus cogens.”). 
 86. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000); see also id. § 41 (1940) (codifying the original 
Alien Tort Claims Act).  
 87. See Hawkins v. Comparet-Cassani, 33 F. Supp. 2d 1244, 1255 (C.D. 
Cal. 1999) (“There is no reported case of a court in the United States recogniz-
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United States courts have been reluctant to rule on cases 
on the basis of jus cogens primarily due to the widespread disa-
greement concerning the methodology for identifying jus cogens 
standards. Without a method to determine what norms qualify 
as jus cogens, states also disagree on which principles have 
achieved that status.88 In cases raising questions concerning 
jus cogens, U.S. courts have relied on narrow definitions of 
these norms. The Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit in 1988 
described only two categories of jus cogens norms: “the prin-
ciples of the United Nations Charter prohibiting the use of 
force” and “fundamental human rights law that prohibits geno-
cide, slavery, murder, torture, prolonged arbitrary detention, 
and racial discrimination.”89 The D.C. Circuit later narrowed 
that definition by relying upon the Restatement (Third) of For-
eign Relations Law of the United States to limit potential jus 
cogens violations to occasions when a state 
practices, encourages, or condones (a) genocide, (b) slavery or slave 
trade, (c) the murder or causing the disappearance of individuals, (d) 
torture or other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punish-
ment, (e) prolonged arbitrary detention, (f ) systematic racial discrim-
ination, or (g) a consistent pattern of gross violations of international-
ly recognized human rights.90 
While the Restatement identifies “systematic racial dis-
crimination” as a jus cogens violation, it is doubtful that courts 
would consider other forms of discrimination (such as discrimi-
nation against noncitizens) as having achieved the status of jus 
cogens. For example, while the Inter-American Commission on 
Human Rights argued that the principle of nondiscrimination 
 
ing a cause of action under jus cogens norms of international law for acts 
committed by United States government officials against a citizen of the Unit-
ed States.”), rev’d on other grounds, 251 F.3d 1230 (9th Cir. 2001).  
 88. These disagreements may stem from confusion concerning how to de-
termine the status of various norms, along with widely differing perspectives 
on both the basis for jus cogens status and which norms ought to achieve that 
status. “[T]he extensive assertions of peremptory norms made by some writers 
and international tribunals, without presenting any evidence to support the 
claimed superior status of the norms under consideration, pose risks for the 
international legal order and the credibility of the authors and tribunals.” Di-
nah Shelton, Normative Hierarchy in International Law, 100 AM. J. INT’L L. 
291, 292 (2006).  
 89. Comm. of U.S. Citizens Living in Nicar., 859 F.2d at 941 (quoting 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 
§ 102 cmt. k (1987)).  
 90. Princz v. Fed. Republic of Germany, 26 F.3d 1166, 1173 (D.C. Cir. 
1994) (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE 
UNITED STATES § 702 & cmt. n (1987) (defining those rights listed in section 
702 as jus cogens principles)).  
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is a jus cogens norm,91 it also conceded that the principle of 
nondiscrimination is not universally accepted as jus cogens.92 
B. APPLICATION OF TREATY OBLIGATIONS IN U.S. COURTS 
Since courts have been reluctant to apply jus cogens within 
the United States, the next step may be for claimants to ask 
courts to require the United States to follow its treaty obliga-
tions under the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights and the International Convention on the Elimination of 
All Forms of Racial Discrimination. Before courts apply these 
principles, they must first determine whether the holding in 
Hoffman conflicts with those treaty obligations. 
1. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(Civil and Political Covenant), ratified by the United States in 
1992, protects a wide range of rights, ranging from personal se-
curity to labor rights.93 Article 2 of the Covenant provides the 
following framework for interpreting the scope of the other ar-
ticles and broadly prohibiting discrimination:  
Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to respect and 
to ensure to all individuals within its territory and subject to its ju-
risdiction the rights recognized in the present Covenant, without dis-
tinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, po-
litical or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or 
other status.94 
The prohibition of discrimination in Article 2 is further de-
veloped by Article 26:  
All persons are equal before the law and are entitled without any dis-
crimination to the equal protection of the law. In this respect, the law 
 
 91. The Commission described the principle opposing racial discrimina-
tion as one that the “international community is unanimous in considering 
that the prohibition of racial discrimination and of practices directly asso-
ciated with it is an obligation erga omnes.” Advisory Opinion OC-18/03, supra 
note 3, at 23. 
 92. Instead, the Commission suggested that some states have failed to co-
dify norms of nondiscrimination: “The jus cogens nature of the principle of 
non-discrimination implies that, owing to their peremptory nature, all States 
must observe these fundamental rules, whether or not they have ratified the 
conventions establishing them, because it is an obligatory principle of interna-
tional common law.” Id. (emphasis added); see also Shelton, supra note 88, at 
310 (discussing the Commission’s conclusion that the international community 
had not yet reached consensus on prohibiting discrimination other than racial 
discrimination). 
 93. See Civil and Political Covenant, supra note 79, arts. 8, 9. 
 94. Id. art. 2.  
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shall prohibit any discrimination and guarantee to all persons equal 
and effective protection against discrimination on any ground such as 
race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, nation-
al or social origin, property, birth or other status.95 
In its General Comment interpreting the Covenant, the 
Human Rights Committee recognized that Article 2 was imme-
diately required of all branches of government within the state. 
If a state’s laws create distinctions between persons based on 
national origin,  
States Parties must refrain from violation of the rights recognized by 
the Covenant, and any restrictions on any of those rights must be 
permissible under the relevant provisions of the Covenant. Where 
such restrictions are made, States must demonstrate their necessity 
and only take such measures as are proportionate to the pursuance of 
legitimate aims in order to ensure continuous and effective protection 
of Covenant rights. In no case may the restrictions be applied or in-
voked in a manner that would impair the essence of a Covenant 
right.96 
2. The International Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Racial Discrimination 
The prohibitions concerning discrimination on the basis of 
national origin are further elaborated in the International Con-
vention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimina-
tion (Race Convention).97 The Race Convention, ratified by the 
United States in 1994, prohibits discrimination relating to em-
ployment.98 The Convention defines racial discrimination very 
broadly as  
any distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference based on race, co-
lour, descent, or national or ethnic origin which has the purpose or ef-
fect of nullifying or impairing the recognition, enjoyment or exercise, 
on an equal footing, of human rights and fundamental freedoms in 
the political, economic, social, cultural or any other field of public 
life.99 
Article 2 of the Convention requires parties to “prohibit 
and bring to an end, by all appropriate means, including legis-
lation as required by circumstances, racial discrimination by 
 
 95. Id. art. 26.  
 96. U.N. Human Rights Comm., General Comment No. 31: The Nature of 
the General Legal Obligation Imposed on States Parties to the Covenant, ¶ 6, 
U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13 (May 26, 2004). 
 97. International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination, opened for signature Mar. 7, 1966, S. EXEC. DOC. C, 95-2, 660 
U.N.T.S. 195.  
 98. See id. art. 5.  
 99. Id. art. 1.  
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any persons, group or organization.”100 Article 5 further re-
quires parties to undertake to guarantee, without racial dis-
crimination, “[t]he rights to work, to free choice of employment, 
to just and favourable conditions of work, to protection against 
unemployment, to equal pay for equal work, to just and favora-
ble remuneration.”101 The Committee on the Elimination of Ra-
cial Discrimination also affirmed that parties must “[t]ake 
measures to eliminate discrimination against non-citizens in 
relation to working conditions and work requirements, includ-
ing employment rules and practices with discriminatory pur-
poses or effects.”102 It also clarified that parties must 
“[r]ecognize that . . . all individuals are entitled to the enjoy-
ment of labour and employment rights, including the freedom 
of assembly and association, once an employment relationship 
has been initiated until it is terminated.”103 
The Race Convention and Civil and Political Covenant pro-
vide courts with two reasons to narrow or overturn Hoffman. 
Courts, however, have been reluctant to apply treaty law do-
mestically, often following the Senate declarations that the 
treaties are non-self-executing and therefore cannot be enforced 
by U.S. courts or utilized to create a private right of action.104 
3. Applying Treaty Law in U.S. Courts 
The Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution states that 
a treaty ratified by the United States is part of the supreme 
law of the land, equal in dignity to federal statutes:  
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be 
made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be 
made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme 
Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound there-
by, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Con-
trary notwithstanding.105 
 
 100. Id. art. 2.  
 101. Id. art. 5.  
 102. U.N. Comm. on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, General 
Recommendation 30: Discrimination Against Non Citizens, ¶ 7.33, in Compila-
tion of General Comments and General Recommendations Adopted by Human 
Rights Treaty Bodies, U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.7/Add.1 (May 4, 2005). 
 103. Id. ¶ 7.35.  
 104. See White v. Paulsen, 997 F. Supp. 1380, 1383 (E.D. Wash. 1998); see 
also Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 728 (2004); Igartúa-de la Rosa v. 
United States, 417 F.3d 145, 150 (1st Cir. 2005) (en banc). 
 105. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2. 
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If a treaty and a federal statute conflict, the more recent 
prevails.106 In this instance, the Civil and Political Covenant, 
ratified in 1992, would predominate over the Labor Relations 
Act of 1935,107 IRCA of 1984, and Title VII of the 1964 Civil 
Rights Act—due to the “last-in-time” doctrine.108  
Though the Constitution states that treaties are the su-
preme law of the land,109 the Supreme Court has developed a 
doctrine that provides that only self-executing treaty provisions 
are judicially enforceable or create a private right of action.110 
Sometimes the rule is phrased in the alternative: treaty clauses 
are enforceable if they are either self-executing or have been 
implemented by legislation.111 The Supreme Court has declined 
to find any provision of the Civil and Political Covenant or the 
Race Convention to be self-executing.112 In Sosa v. Alvarez-
Machain, the Supreme Court bolstered its call for judicial re-
straint in applying the Civil and Political Covenant by citing 
the Senate’s declaration in ratifying the treaty: “Several times, 
indeed, the Senate has expressly declined to give the federal 
courts the task of interpreting and applying international hu-
man rights law, as when its ratification of the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights declared that the sub-
stantive provisions of the document were not self-executing.”113  
Courts are not bound by the Senate’s declaration on ratifi-
cation because the task of interpreting treaties rests with the 
courts.114 In The Federalist, Alexander Hamilton explained that 
“treaties of the United States to have any force at all, must be 
considered as part of the law of the land. Their true import as 
far as respects individuals, must, like all other laws, be ascer-
 
 106. See The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. 581, 600 (1889); Julian G. 
Ku, Treaties as Laws: A Defense of the Last-in-Time Rule for Treaties and Fed-
eral Statutes, 80 IND. L.J. 319, 325 (2005).  
 107. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151–169 (2000). 
 108. While the United States has certainly updated immigration statutes 
since the 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act, the Court’s decision in 
Hoffman was based exclusively upon the policy rationale within the IRCA. See 
Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137, 147–52 (2002).  
 109. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2. 
 110. See United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655, 667 (1992); Me-
dellín v. Texas, 128 S. Ct. 1346, 1356 (2008). 
 111. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. at 667.  
 112. See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 738 (2004). 
 113. Id. at 728. 
 114. See Lori Fisler Damrosch, The Role of the United States Senate Con-
cerning “Self-Executing” and “Non-Self-Executing” Treaties, 67 CHI.-KENT L. 
REV. 515, 531 (1991).  
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tained by judicial determinations.”115 Under the Supremacy 
Clause, courts maintain the privilege to treat treaties as they 
do other forms of law, meaning that courts ought to be allowed 
to both interpret and apply those provisions. Courts, however, 
have so far been loathe to question the Senate’s declarations 
that the Civil and Political Covenant and the Race Convention 
are non-self-executing.116  
C. USING INTERNATIONAL LAW AS AN INTERPRETIVE TOOL IN 
U.S. COURTS 
Even if courts are not bound by the prohibition of discrimi-
nation against noncitizens as an arguably jus cogens norm and 
as a provision of the Civil and Political Covenant and the Race 
Convention, courts can still consider the extremely negative in-
ternational response to Hoffman and the nondiscrimination 
norm as it relates to U.S. statutes such as Title VII. United 
States discrimination in employment against noncitizens has 
persuaded the Mexican government to file a complaint in the 
Inter-American Court of Human Rights and to get a judgment 
that opposes the U.S. practice.117 Further, in 2006, the U.N. 
Human Rights Committee questioned the United States about 
this decision when the United States filed its report under the 
Civil and Political Covenant.118 
The Hoffman Court weighed the objective of the immigra-
tion law to deter undocumented workers from entering the 
United States against the desire of workers to organize un-
ions.119 In its balancing analysis, the Court failed to take ade-
quate account of the principle of nondiscrimination as empha-
sized by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. Instead of 
 
 115. THE FEDERALIST NO. 22, at 143 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke 
ed., 1961).  
 116. See, e.g., Igartúa-de la Rosa v. United States, 417 F.3d 145, 150–51 
(1st Cir. 2005) (en banc) (determining that neither the Constitution nor the 
Civil and Political Covenant requires the United States to extend the right to 
vote to citizens of Puerto Rico). 
 117. Advisory Opinion OC-18/03, supra note 3, at 1–2. 
 118. See generally U.N. Human Rights Comm., List of Issues to Be Taken 
up in Connection with the Consideration of the Second and Third Periodic Re-
ports of the United States of America, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/USA/Q/3 (Apr. 26, 
2006); see also International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of 
Racial Discrimination, Geneva, Switz., Feb. 18–Mar. 7, 2008, Concluding Ob-
servations of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination: Unit-
ed States of America, ¶ 28, U.N. Doc. CERD/C/USA/CO/6 (Feb. 2008). 
 119. See Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137, 149–50 
(2002). 
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weighing the goals of preventing entry into the United States of 
undocumented workers versus unionization rights, the Court 
should weigh immigration policy versus both the right to organ-
ize and the principle of nondiscrimination. Even if U.S. courts 
do not recognize nondiscrimination as a jus cogens norm,120 the 
Inter-American Court of Human Rights decision should in-
crease the attention courts pay to the precept of nondiscrimina-
tion in interpreting Title VII and other workplace issues. 
In cases involving human rights, courts have often looked 
to international law for evolving standards of legal protection. 
For example, in Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, the Su-
preme Court determined that the principles of the law of na-
tions should apply to the task of statutory interpretation since 
“an act of congress ought never to be construed to violate the 
law of nations, if any other possible construction remains.”121 In 
a case where the court must consider the IRCA prohibition on 
the employment of undocumented noncitizens, the courts 
should use the international norm against discrimination and 
relevant treaty obligations as interpretive tools determining 
both the extent of Title VII coverage and whether Hoffman 
should be overturned. 
The Supreme Court has even used this approach in inter-
preting the U.S. Constitution. In Atkins v. Virginia, Justice 
John Paul Stevens, writing for himself and five other Justices, 
relied in 2002 upon the fact that “within the world community, 
the imposition of the death penalty for crimes committed by 
mentally retarded offenders is overwhelmingly disapproved” 
and concluded that the execution of persons with mental retar-
dation would offend civilized standards of decency in interpret-
ing the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and un-
usual punishment.122 In Lawrence v. Texas, the Supreme Court 
 
 120. See supra notes 85–90 and accompanying text (discussing the reluc-
tance of U.S. courts to consider jus cogens norms). 
 121. Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804).  
 122. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 316 n.21 (2002). The Court similarly 
cited international norms in juvenile death penalty cases. See Roper v. Sim-
mons, 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005) (acknowledging “the overwhelming weight of 
international opinion against the juvenile death penalty”); Thompson v. Okla-
homa, 487 U.S. 815, 830–31 (1988) (plurality opinion).  
In 1989, then-Chief Justice William Rehnquist stated that, since “consti-
tutional law is solidly grounded in so many [foreign] countries, it is time that 
the United States courts begin looking to the decisions of other constitutional 
courts to aid in their own deliberative process.” William Rehnquist, Constitu-
tional Courts—Comparative Remarks, in GERMANY AND ITS BASIC LAW: PAST, 
PRESENT AND FUTURE—A GERMAN-AMERICAN SYMPOSIUM 411, 412 (Paul  
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cited international protections for the right to privacy and non-
discrimination in declaring unconstitutional a state law prohi-
biting consensual sodomy between same-sex persons.123 “The 
right the petitioners seek in this case,” said the Court, “has 
been accepted as an integral part of human freedom in many 
other countries. There has been no showing that in this country 
the governmental interest in circumscribing personal choice is 
somehow more legitimate or urgent.”124 Following a similar ap-
proach, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg’s concurring opinion in 
Grutter v. Bollinger cited the Race Convention in support of an 
international consensus for race-conscious affirmative action 
programs.125  
United States courts could use the Inter-American Court of 
Human Rights decision as an interpretive or comparative tool, 
as advocated by Justice Breyer:  
 
Kirchhof & Donald P. Kommers eds., 1993). Other advocates have documented 
the Supreme Court’s history of applying international law. See e.g., Brief Ami-
ci Curiae of Mary Robinson et al. in Support of Petitioners at 3–8, Lawrence v. 
Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (No. 02-102), 2003 WL 164151, at *3–8. The Court 
has a significant history of considering international law. See, e.g., Miranda v. 
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 488–89 (1966) (comparing U.S. practice with that of In-
dia, Sri Lanka, and Scotland); Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 548 (1961) (Har-
lan, J., dissenting) (delimiting the notion of privacy in the home by looking to 
“common understanding throughout the English-speaking world”); Quinn v. 
United States, 349 U.S. 155, 167 (1955) (finding the practice of allowing a wit-
ness to object “supported by long-standing tradition here and in other English-
speaking nations”); Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 169 (1952) (holding 
that the Due Process Clause obliges courts to ascertain whether laws offend 
“those canons of decency and fairness which express the notions of justice of 
English-speaking peoples”); Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401, 413 (1945) 
(Frankfurter, J., concurring) (“The safeguards of ‘due process of law’ and ‘the 
equal protection of the laws’ summarize the history of freedom of English-
speaking peoples . . . .”); Rast v. Van Deman & Lewis Co., 240 U.S. 342, 366 
(1916) (explaining that a constitution embodies “‘only relatively fundamental 
rules of right, as generally understood by all English-speaking communities’” 
(quoting Otis v. Parker, 187 U.S. 606, 609 (1903))).  
 123. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 573. 
 124. Id. at 577. The Supreme Court cited to a decision of the European 
Court of Human Rights, Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, 45 Eur. Ct. H.R. (1981), 
as persuasive authority when it held that a Texas law criminalizing homosex-
ual sodomy was unconstitutional. Id. at 573; id. at 576 (“Other nations, too, 
have taken action consistent with an affirmation of the protected right of ho-
mosexual adults to engage in intimate, consensual conduct.”); Harold Hongju 
Koh, International Law as Part of Our Law, 98 AM. J. INT’L L. 43, 50–55 
(2004).  
 125. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 344 (2003) (Ginsburg, J., concur-
ring); see David Weissbrodt, International Human Rights Law Perspective on 
Grutter and Gratz, 21 CONST. COMMENT. 275, 276–77 (2004) (examining Jus-
tice Ginsburg’s use of international law). 
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These growing institutional and substantive similarities [between the 
U.S. and other nations] are important because to a degree they reflect 
a common aspiration—a near-universal desire for judicial institutions 
that, through guarantees of fair treatment, help to provide the securi-
ty necessary for investment and, in turn, economic prosperity. 
Through their respect for basic human liberty, they may help to make 
that liberty a reality.126 
Following this comparative approach, the Court would val-
ue Title VII’s remedies to deter discrimination over immigra-
tion policies because of the status given to nondiscrimination in 
international court decisions and treaties. 
  CONCLUSION   
In Hoffman, the Supreme Court refused to allow undocu-
mented noncitizens to obtain back-pay remedies for an illegal 
firing stemming from their unionization activities. In the six 
years since that decision, U.S. courts have appeared confused 
about the reach of the Hoffman decision and what employment 
remedies are foreclosed to undocumented noncitizens. Two 
prominent international adjudication bodies have criticized the 
Hoffman decision in opinions stressing the necessary protec-
tions of labor rights and the primary status of nondiscrimina-
tion. 
In addition, both the Civil and Political Covenant and the 
Race Convention have provisions that conflict with Hoffman. In 
challenges to Hoffman, U.S. courts may be reluctant to rely 
upon either a new application of jus cogens or treaty provisions 
that may not be self-executing. Nonetheless, the principles ela-
borated by the Supreme Court in Charming Betsy and applied 
by judges in Atkins, Grutter, Lawrence, and other decisions 
might assist courts in using international decisions and treaty 
provisions against discrimination as interpretive tools to avoid 
further discrimination against undocumented employees in the 
workplace. 
 
 126. Stephen Breyer, Assoc. Justice, Supreme Court of the U.S., Keynote 
Address at the 97th Annual Meeting of the American Society of International 
Law Proceedings: Conflict and Coordination Across International Regimes 
(Apr. 2003), in 97 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 265, 267 (2003).  
